CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

OF THE

YALTA CONFERENCE

AN ABSTRACT OF

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by James D. Turner June 1970 The purpose of the thesis is to explore several of the controversial issues of the Yalta Conference: namely the preparedness of President Franklin D. Roosevelt for this conference both mentally and physically; the Polish situation involving both the government in exile in England and the Lublin Government which was Communist-centered and was based in Poland; the Polish boundary situation in which Poland lost some land to Russia but gained some from Germany; and last, the entrance of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War against Japan.

Research indicated, with increasing validity, that there are two strongly contrasting interpretations of this conference: (1) Complete reliance in both what President Roosevelt was trying to do and in our foreign policy concerning the agreements reached at Yalta; (2) The suspicion that perhaps President Roosevelt was not well, that he tried to control Stalin and failed, and that he also made major concessions to the Russians in spite of repeated warnings from key sources, such as the General Deane (Chief of the American Military Mission to Moscow) letter indicates.

In the overview of the thesis the reader is made aware of why the Yalta Conference was held; why it was held at Yalta; the staffs present at the Conference from The

United States, The United Kingdom, and The Soviet Union; and, finally, a complete brief on what transpired at the Yalta Conference is presented.

Chapter II, entitled "Preparedness," gives the reader a complete look into the two developing theories mentioned above.

Roosevelt's health is deeply investigated and there is no doubt that Roosevelt was mentally and physically tired from his fourth term campaign and inauguration. Key words come from Lord Moran, Winston Churchill's doctor, W. Averell Harriman, Winston Churchill, James F. Byrnes, and Roosevelt's critics such as authors John T. Flynn and William Henry Chamberlain to name a few, pointing out that Franklin D. Roosevelt was not a well man at Yalta. On the other hand, former Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and author Robert E. Sherwood clearly support the theory that he was all right physically.

Chapter III of the thesis deals with the Polish situation involving the two governments backed by the Allies, the switch in support from the London exile Government to the Lublin Government, and the boundary situations which in essence were complete and utter violations of the famed Atlantic Charter of August 1941.

The question of the Soviet Union's entrance into the Pacific War is dealt with in Chapter IV. The questions brought out here are if the U.S.S.R. was really needed at

this particular time and were the right people consulted concerning this matter? The way the secret agreements regarding China were handled are also elaborated upon as well as the impression left after reading about Chiang Kai-shek's treatment here and especially in General Wedemeyer's letter of the handling of this particular event. Perhaps we still have guilt feelings today, and this is why our Seventh Fleet is in the area. In addition to published eyewitness reports, opinions, and interpretations concerning the Yalta Conference, the author has written to many people who were present at the Conference, interviewed recognized scholars in this field and included their unpublished opinions and comments in the body and appendix of this thesis.

The final chapter of the paper has the conclusion that Roosevelt was a sick man when he went to Yalta. He went with the thought of preserving his idea of the United Nations and doing all in his power to keep his dream alive even if it meant violating the Atlantic Charter with the Polish situation and dealing crippling blows to idealism and moral values long carried high by most Americans.